"We have no allies," says the international expert on Trump, China's strategy, and the outlook for defeating Russia.

Ukraine's foreign policy illusions began to gradually dissolve following the start of the full-scale war. The prospect of joining NATO has not materialized, and the threat of aid cessation after Trump's inauguration somewhat undermines the belief in a "benevolent" West that will never abandon us.

Why are our partners not assisting us as we desire? Are they afraid or do they simply not see the need? What cruel joke has the policy of multi-vectorism played on Ukraine? How did we "sleep through" the change in the world order, and is there still a chance to "wake up" and set things right? These and other topics were discussed by "Telegraf" with Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, PhD in Political Science Nikolai Kapitonenkо.

The Decline of the West

– Nikolai, I follow your posts on Facebook, and you consistently emphasize that we cannot realistically assess the realities in our international politics. Let’s take a moment now to assess them soberly and understand what is going wrong.

– This began quite some time ago. At a certain point, the views, habits, and assessments that emerged in the 1990s became entrenched as the main ones. The world has changed significantly over the past 25 years, yet our assessments remain as they were back then. We built our foreign policy on these outdated assessments, at least for the last 20 years.

Kuchma's multi-vectorism was based on the world he dealt with in the 1990s. The characteristics of that world included a historically minimal gap between Ukraine's and Russia's power potential, Russia's pro-Western foreign policy, and the dominance of the West. That was the world of the 1990s. In such a world, to maximize Ukraine's chances for success, a multi-vector policy was chosen.

Then changes began, making it difficult to continue the multi-vector policy. Russia grew stronger and ceased to be pro-Western. This posed new challenges for Ukraine. We tried to address them, relying on the goodwill and sincere intentions of the West. We believed that the West was so kind and altruistic and would do what we needed. We interpreted the history of the 1990s with other Central and Eastern European countries that joined NATO and the EU, which provided significant assistance. We thought we would experience something similar. But by the 2000s, especially after Putin's speech in Munich in 2007, it became clear that the world would no longer be the same. And Ukrainian foreign policy needed to adapt to these new realities. However, we failed to assess the changes. We continued to hope that we would be accepted into NATO; we just needed to insist more, and everything would be fine. We hoped that we would join the EU and that our economic problems and security issues would be resolved for us.

We also continued to pursue a rather risky policy towards Russia: underestimating its determination and willingness to break the rules. Ultimately, we did not deeply study what was happening inside Russia. Plus, there were many myths, some of which are resurfacing even now, such as the idea that if Ukraine had retained its nuclear weapons, everything would have been different. This reflects a superficial view of how modern international politics operates.

– Then explain how exactly the world changed at the end of the 1990s, what we missed, and how this misunderstanding played a cruel joke on us.

– The main trend that began in the 2000s was the decline of the West and what could be termed the hegemony of the United States. In fact, U.S. hegemony (leading role) emerged after World War I. They successfully maintained it for 100 years. Various competitors arose: Great Britain, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and finally China. All these attempts [to usurp leadership] reduced the U.S. ability to maintain its leading role. After the Cold War, we lived for 10 years in a period of Western triumph. Western values, institutions, international organizations, and models of societal and individual life seemed to be without alternatives.

This had security implications: the West's position in several regions strengthened after the Soviet Union's exit. The West actively restructured the world according to its interests and vision. But in 2003, this process shifted in the opposite direction, primarily due to the beginning of the decline of this relative U.S. hegemony.

– Why specifically 2003? What triggered the decline?

– Hegemony was built (and still is based) on economic power. Approximately 20-22% of global economic output comes from the U.S. This level was reached in the 1970s and has remained since. It relied on American might and "soft" power: the ability to attract allies, appeal to others, and spread its values. All this worked well until the start of the Iraq War in 2003. After that, problems arose. The Iraq War polarized public opinion in the U.S. and the West. It significantly reduced the "soft" power capabilities and attractiveness of the U.S. in the world. The war had countless long-term effects. One of these is that Russia began to view Americans as a threat. Accordingly, to safeguard itself from the fate of Saddam Hussein, Putin changed the foreign policy foundations of the Russian state. He began to pursue a completely different foreign policy.

Since then, this trend has intensified. And it is not so much due to the weakening of the U.S. as it is due to the strengthening of China. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has transformed into a global power. China is the largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity. The level of competition is something the U.S. has not faced in the last 100 years. The economic potential of the Soviet Union, even at its peak, was about 30% of that of the U.S. Today, the Chinese economy surpasses the American one, and that gap is widening. Time is working against the U.S. China is the largest trading partner for most countries in the world. It is the world's workshop. And China is bringing other countries along, converting its economic potential into political and diplomatic influence. Thus, a full-fledged alternative power pole is being established, which did not exist in 2003 or the 1990s. Back then, it seemed that no state could challenge American power in the foreseeable future. Consequently, everything we associate with Western ways of life, Western institutions, and values has come into crisis.

Since 2009, democratization, also linked to the triumph of Western values, has given way to a reverse trend. The number of authoritarian countries and the proportion of the population living under authoritarian regimes has increased. Democracy is becoming less popular. Alternative coalitions and alliances of various non-Western states are forming. Regional conflicts are intensifying, and the West has fewer opportunities to defend its interests and ultimately succeed.

"We Have No Allies"

– How should Ukraine act in the context of these global changes? We have bet on the West, but could we have bet on the Global South? How exactly? What should we have done for that? How could things have been different for us?

– It is not about joining the Global South. That would be too radical. However, considering the state and type of our economy, Ukraine should reflect on where we belong. The West, from an economic perspective, consists of highly developed wealthy societies. It is a post-industrial economy that exports capital and technology. Agricultural, industrial, and resource countries are what the Global South is about. But this is still a philosophical question, as foreign policy should not always be determined by the type of economy. In our case, it should be determined by the balance of power, interests, and the capabilities of our neighbors.

Today, we need to more realistically assess the interests and intentions of everyone around us: both our adversaries, like Russia, and our partners. We need to understand that we have no allies. An ally is someone who has an obligation to defend you. And we are not members of organizations like NATO. Although membership in NATO does not imply automatic involvement in a war if one of the NATO members is attacked.

We have no legally binding agreements with any state stating that they are obliged to defend us. If such agreements do not exist, then we also have no allies. To build our foreign policy as if we have these allies is dangerous because at some point, we could find ourselves without help. Partners may begin to behave in ways that do not align with our interests or as we would like.

It is one thing to believe that we will soon be accepted into NATO; we just need to speak up a bit louder or enshrine it in our Constitution. It is another situation if we approach this cautiously and understand that we will not be joining NATO anytime soon, or that something unpredictable may happen with NATO itself. Then our foreign policy will be different.

– Alright, if we are now freeing ourselves from these illusions, what do we do next? How do we build our pragmatic policy?

– It is already too late to discuss something like that. Today, in my opinion, there is virtually no foreign policy in Ukraine. We have no room for maneuver